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1INTRODUCTION
United Nations Secretary-General Javier Per6z de Cuellar 
recently remarked that "the pursuit of peace has quickened its pace 
throughout the UN."1 Within the last year, UN activities have 
facilitated the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a cease-fire in the 
Iran-Iraq war, the Namibian peace accords and progress on regional 
disputes in Cyprus, Cambodia and the Western Sahara. Perez's 
optimism would seem to be supported by the growing Soviet and 
Japanese Involvement in UN activities as well as the more moderate 
and responsible tone of the organization's non-Western majority.
The prospect of a less politicized and more effective UN has 
significant implications for US foreign policy. After years of 
disaffection, American policymakers will now have to decide what 
kind of role the United States should play in this increasingly 
influential organization. Exploring the future possibilities warrants a 
clear understanding of the history of American participation in the 
UN. Our Intent in presenting such a history is to answer the question: 
To what extent has US participation in the UN served American 
Interest? There is no straightfoward answer. Not only have policy 
objectives varied over time, but the US has pursued different interests 
in relation to the different functions of the UN. In fact, the pattern of 
policy divergence over time is so pronounced, that perhaps the best 
way to describe the complex nature of US policy to the UN is to
characterize the organization as if there were really two "Urited 
Nations."
Former Assistant Secretary-General George Sherry distinguishes 
between the "political" and "operational" components of the United 
Nations. The former "receives the media attention," while the latter 
performs the organization's "substantive functions."2 The "two UN" 
dichotomy employed in this thesis further develops and expands upon 
Sherry's distinction. Unless otherwise acknowledged, usage of the 
terms "first" and "second UN" are not directly attributable to Sherry.
First, there is the United Nations of the General Assembly, 
ECOSOC and other deliberative organs. Its practical function is to 
serve as a forum for public debates, multilateral diplomacy and passing 
resolutions. As a result of its highly politicized nature, the "first UN" 
has provoked much frustration and annoyance. However, during the 
1950's the US placed great emphasis on "propaganda" considerations 
in the use of the General Assembly and, in turn, contributed to its 
polarized action. When the composition of UN membership changed, 
the same tactics began to be used to the US' disadvantage.
There is also the UN of the Secretariat, the Security Council, the 
Trusteeship Council and various service agencies. This is the UN of 
quiet diplomacy, conflict management and a multitude of operational, 
technical and assistance tasks. In Sherry's view, these components 
have been "an Indispensable stabilizing factor in the management of
the international system and are of great value to the United States in 
dealing with global problems that 'defy unilateral solution'."3
Although the US has benefitted from its participation in the UN, 
neither has fulfilled the lofty expectations of the organization's 
founders. The UN of the General Assembly remained an important 
and helpful factor in US foreign policy only as long as Washington 
could control it. While the US has been able to advance its objectives 
more consistently in the "second United Nations," numerous setbacks 
have occurred in these bodies as well. Moreover, American efforts to 
obtain support of its interests have been undermined by the failure to 
recognize the organization's political nature, the shortage of diplomats 
trained in multilateral diplomacy and, most significantly, the inability 
of the United States to shape a coherent role for itself at the UN.
The need for a comprehensive vision of the US role at the UN 
will heighten in the 1990's. Growing awareness of the many factors 
that contribute to interdependency will prompt the US and other 
nations to Increase their reliance on multilateral organizations. 
American attempts to unilaterally deal with certain transnational 
problems will simply not be as effective as multilateral efforts. The 
success of the UN system as a whole depends to a great extent upon 
Washington reasserting its leadership in the organization. As other 
nations increase their involvement in UN activities, decisive American 
leadership will be necessary if UN support of US interests is to be 
obtained. Consequently, the United States should forge a new role for
itself in the UN. Based on a comprehensive set of policies, the US 
could promote greater moderation in the "first United Nations" and 
the expanded effectiveness and influence of the "second United 
Nations."
PRINCIPLE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 'TWO
UNITED NATONS" CONCEPT
The concept of "two United Nations" is a useful device for 
analyzing the divergent facets of US policy to the United Nations. The 
principle organs of the UN are briefly described and categorized 
below. Constituents of each category are listed in order of relative 
importance.
The "First United Nations"
The General Assembly. With the exception of the South African 
delegation, all UN members participate in the General Assembly and 
each has one vote. The Assembly meets annually from mid-September 
to late December. It’s main functions include formulation of 
nonbinding policy recommendations and the selection of some 
member of other UN organs. Until last year, it also controlled the 
finances of the UN. Most of the Assembly's work is completed in its 
seven main committees.4
The General Assembly Is the most Important component of the 
"first United Nations." It Is the main forum of opinion within the 
organization. Public perceptions of the UN are greatly Influenced by 
the actions of the Assembly's majority. Prior to 1960, the US could 
muster a majority on virtually any issue in the Assembly. The 
admission of many new states, primarily from the developing world, 
resulted in the deterioration of the American position. The use of the 
Assembly as a forum for global anti-Americanism has received much 
publicity and has contributed to a large extent of the American 
frustration with the entire UN system.
ECOSOC.  The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
coordinates the economic, social, scientific and human rights affairs of 
the UN. With ECOSOC's membership limited to 54 countries, 
developing nations prefer to deal with these issues in the General 
Assembly. The Assembly has created Its own subsidiary bodies for 
discussion of many topics officially within ECOSOC's Jurisdiction. 
ECOSOC meets twice a year for approximately one month.5
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Also known as the World 
Court, the ICJ is both the constitutional court of the UN and court of 
law among member-states. The ICJ has fifteen judges who are 
selected by the General Assembly and the Security Council for nine 
year terms. Upon formal request, the Court has the authority to 
render advisory opinions. These opinions are unenforceable. Like 
resolutions in the General Assembly, the Court depends upon the
willingness of members to comply with Its rulings. The ICJ rarely 
Influences the actions of member-states and continues to receive little 
public attention.6 As a result. It Is considered the least important 
component of "first United Nations."
The "Second United Nations"
The most Important components of the "second United Nations" 
are the Security Council and the Secretariat. In different manners, 
the main purpose of both is the fulfillment the founder's principle 
objective: to create a system for global security and international crisis 
management. The relative importance of the other components has 
changed greatly since 1945. Whereas the Trusteeship Council played 
a significant role in the decolonization process, its relative importance 
has declined since 1960. Many of the ex-colonial and developing 
nations rely upon the functions of the service agencies. The functions 
of these agencies have become increasingly important to the 
developed nations as well. In many instances, the agencies present a 
cost-effective alternative to unilateral efforts. Weather forecasting, for 
example, by the World Meteorological Organization provides the US 
with much needed access to data from other nations which the US 
could not gather by itself.
The Security Council. The primary responsibility of the Security 
Council is the maintenance of international peace and security. The
Council is authorized by the UN Charter to act to achieve peaceful 
settlement of disputes, It may also determine the esdstence of any 
threat to international peace or acts of aggression, make 
recommendations for collective action and to establish peacekeeping 
forces. The fifteen member Council has five permanent members (US, 
China, France, Britain, USSR), each of whom have the power of veto. 
Non-permanent members are nominated by regional caucuses and 
selected for two year terms. Decisions in the Council require nine 
votes. Of course, a negative vote by any permanent member is 
sufficient to defeat a motion. While the Security Council has achieved 
peaceful settlement of some crises, effective decision making has been 
stifled, until recently, by the disunity of the permanent members.7
The Secretariat. Administration of the programs and policies of 
other UN organs is the responsibility of the Secretariat. The 
Secretary-General is elected by the General Assembly for a five year 
term. The UN Charter authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to 
the attention of the .Security Council any matter which threatens 
international peace and security. He may also use the good offices to 
resolve international disputes. Activities of particular Secretary- 
Generals have received varying degrees of American support.8
The Service Agencies. There are a myriad of service agencies 
clustered around the UN. The activities and programs of the service 
agencies address some of the most critical global challenges. Each 
agency maintains a varying degree of autonomy. The agencies can be
divided into two major classifications, special programs and 
specialized agencies. Since a full account of these is beyond the scope 
of this study, only the relevant examples of each classification will be 
described.
The special programs were created by and report to the General 
Assembly. Financed by voluntary contributions, the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) provides technical and financial assistance 
as well as emergency relief to children in developing countries.9 
Similarly, the World Food Program (WFP) supplies emergency food 
relief and provides food aid for projects enhancing self-sufficiency. 
The Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
offers material assistance and physical protection to refugees, and 
works with governments to resettle th: a .10 All UN development 
work is coordinated by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). Financed by voluntary contributions, it is the largest 
multilateral assistance program in the world.11 Mounting pressure 
from the developing world to establish a forum to promote their 
economic interests resulted in the formation of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).12
The specialized agencies are fully autonomous organizations 
related to the UN by special agreement. Perhaps the most renown of 
these organizations, the World Health Organization (WHO) coordinates 
International public health programs, conducts immunization 
campaigns, sponsors research and provides technical assistance to
many countries.13 The aim of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to promote 
international cooperation in education, science, culture and 
communications.14 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was 
created in order to increase world food production, raise rural living 
standards and provide relief in famine situations.15 The 
responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are 
to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to establish to 
prevent the diversion of peaceful nuclear materials for military use. 
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) coordinates global 
weather reporting and forecasting.16
Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council was established 
in order to provide assistance to the 11 Trust Territories, all former 
colonies, in their quest for self-determination. According to John 
Conrad, the Council administered the territories "through a system 
whereby authority would be delegated to a member state taking 
responsibility for the government of a Trust Territory, periodically 
reporting on progress toward self-government."17 With the exception 
of the American-administered Pacific Island Trust and the problematic 
situation of the South West African Trust (known as Namibia), all trust 
territories have gained independence.18 As a result, the Trusteeship 
Council has become relatively unimportant.
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THE US MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS (USUN)
The United States Is represented at the United Nations by a 
permanent mission. With a staff in New York City of approximately 
120 persons, the chief of the mission Is the US permanent 
representative (permanent rep). The permanent representative 
represents the US in the Security Council, has ambassadorial rank and 
had, from 1953-1989, cabinet status. Ambassador rank is also given to 
four deputies: the deputy permanent representative to the UN, the
deputy representative for the Security Council, the ECOSOC 
representative and the alternate representative for special political 
affairs. Under the leadership of the permanent rep, the US delegation 
to the General Assembly is composed of eight prominent individuals 
from the arts, sciences and academe and two members of Congress. 
In theory, the permanent representatives reports to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (IO).19 
According to the Department of State, the main functions of USUN 
are:
(1) Planning the tactical pursuit of US policy objectives in 
UN organs and bodies: (2) carrying out consultations, 
negotiations and liaison with other delegations and the UN 
Secretariat: (3) preparing policy recommendations to the 
Department of State; (4) reporting to the Department of 
State on consultations and developments in the United 
Nations; (5) discharging US responsibilities as "host 
government...20
The US also maintains a permanent mission in Geneva known as the 
the US Mission to the European Office of the United Nations. Headed
by a representative with the rank of ambassador, the mission oversees 
US participation in the various Geneva-based agencies, such as the 
WHO and UNCTAD. In addition, the US maintains a mission at the 
IAEA headquarters in Vienna and an observer mission to UNESCO in 
Paris.21
US PARTICIPATION IN THE UN: A BRIEF HISTORY
The main lines of development of US policy to the United 
Nations can be sub-divided into five periods. Within each period, we 
can identify the major trends and events.
1945-60: Era of American Dominance
During this period, the United States financed 40 percent of the 
organization's assessed budget, became the permanent home of the 
UN headquarters and could muster a majority in the General Assembly 
on almost any issue. As American policy makers became aware of the 
size and character of postwar problems, lofty goals were replaced by 
short-term political objectives.
Original Expectations
When the United Nations was founded on June 26, 1945, the 
organization had the overwhelming support of the American public
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and Its leadership. The United States had already played a leading 
role In the creation of the UN. After the US Senate ratified the United 
Nations Participation Act In October 1945, the President, Harry 
Truman, stated that the UN would become the cornerstone of US 
foreign policy.22 In his first address to the General Assembly, Truman 
said the United States will:
...support the United Nations with all the resources that 
we possess; not as a temporary expedient but as a 
permanent partnership. We realize that nothing less than 
fidelity to the principles and faithful effort to achieve the 
purposes of the Charter will meet the genuine needs of any
nation, whether large or small."23
An indication of the importance of the UN to the President was his 
selection of Secretary of State Edward Stettinlus as the first 
permanent representative. When Stettinlus resigned in early 1946 to 
take an academic post, he was replaced by Truman's close friend, US 
Senator Warren Austin (R-Vermont). Despite Austin's high standing, 
most policy decisions concerning the UN were made by the Truman, 
his Secretaries of State and other foreign policy advisors.24
American interest In the United Nations Initially focused on its 
potential role in collective security. During the Second World War, 
President Roosevelt and other prominent leaders became convinced 
that an international system of collective security was Indispensable to 
world stability. The establishment of a United Nations, designed to 
provide such a system, was pursued with particular zeal. Most 
members of the American delegation to the San Fransisco Conference
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felt that the fundamental Importance of great power unity (Britain, US 
and USSR), and domination of, postwar security action justified the 
view that actions of the Security Council must be taken with the 
unanimous consent of its permanent members. Maintenance of the 
wartime alliance, particularly Soviet cooperation, was viewed as crucial 
to the success of the organization. It was also hoped that Soviet 
participation in the United Nations' security machinery would 
somehow inhibit Stalin's expansionist tendencies. In the aftermath of 
the San Fransisco Conference, many members of Truman's cabinet and 
Congress believed that the essential element of collective security 
would be the ability of the Security Council to fulfill its responsibility 
for the maintenance of International peace and security.25 George 
Marshall even suggested that the activities of the Council should be 
considered a central component of American defense policy.26
Despite initial American opposition, a series of compromises at 
the San Fransisco Conference conferred far-reaching powers and 
responsibilities on the other organs of the United Nations. Early 
expectations of these organs were, in most cases, quite nebulous. The 
first Presidential report to Congress concerning US policy to the UN 
suggests utilizing the General Assembly to set the goals and objectives 
of the entire UN system; to establish a "climate of opinion within 
which the international community functions;" and, to cultivate the 
force of world opinion in order to exert influence on the policies of 
other member-states.27 Ostensibly, ECOSOC would become the focus 
of American efforts to mend the economic and social wounds of the
Second World War. The most urgent problem was providing services 
for the care and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.28 An 
additional area of concern, although outside the auspices of ECOSOC, 
was the status of former colonial territories. President Truman and 
Secretary of State Byrnes were clear in their refusal to endorse the 
reconstitution of empires. However, In 1945, a mechanism for 
implementing the provisions of the UN Charter concerning the 
administration of non-self-governing territories had not yet been 
determined.29 As for the World Court, American acceptance of Its 
Jurisdiction was postponed because of intense Congressional scrutiny.
US policy to the United Nations reflected these expectations 
until at least mid-1947. Efforts centered on the establishment of 
mechanisms and activities that could carry out the anticipated 
functions of the various organs. Unfortunately, the difficulties between 
East and West were soon evident In the tone of the debates and 
diminished reliance on great power consultations.30
The Demise of "Great Power" Unity
The deterioration of Soviet-US relations, coupled with the 
economic crisis in Western Europe and Britain’s inability to maintain 
its global responsibilities, had far-reaching effects on US policy to the 
United Nations. From mid-1947 through the invasion of South Korea, 
few attempts were made to use the UN as the mechanism for such 
important Cold War programs as economic aid for Europe or military 
aid for Greece and Turkey. The Truman Administration never
intended to utilize the UN as a security agency against one of the other 
great powers. The US began to rely on the UN for its value as a public 
forum. In the meantime, the problems of the developing world and 
the process of decolonization assumed greater prominence.31
Antagonism between the US and USSR quickly extended to the 
UN. In January 1946, Iran charged that the USSR was failing to 
withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan in accordance with an agreement 
between the governments. The US position, which received the 
backing of the Security Council, was that the UN should take no 
immediate action other than to encourage negotiations between the 
USSR and Iran. The Council retained the matter on its agenda. When 
the Soviets did not leave by agreed upon date of March 2, Secretary of 
State Byrnes send a stern warning to the Soviets. Several weeks later, 
the Soviets announced the immediate withdrawal of all troops from 
the disputed territory. Truman attributed the withdrawal to the 
warning "coupled with the moral force of the United Nations."32 
However, McGeorge Bundy argues that Truman never presented the 
USSR with an ultimatum during this crisis. In Danger and Survival, he 
writes that the lack of any kind of ultimatum "certainly helped Iranian 
leaders to resist Soviet pressure for concessions, and the Americans 
also encouraged close attention in the Security Council...in a way that 
plainly embarrassed Moscow."33
Action in the Security Council was soon stymied by the Soviet 
veto. The first major US resolution to be vetoed by the USSR
concerned a timetable for the British and French troop withdrawal 
from Syria and Lebanon. Both Britain and France decided to abide by 
the provisions of the vetoed resolution. An area of particular US 
concern was the Greek Civil War. In 1946, the Greek government 
formally charged that its northern neighbors were providing support 
to communist rebels and requested the Security Council to conduct an 
on-the-spot investigation. A commission of investigation was 
established soon thereafter. A majority of the members on the 
Council, basing their conclusions on the evidence uncovered by the 
commission, agreed that the actions of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania 
constituted a threat to the political independence and territorial 
integrity of Greece. Resolutions concerning the Greek civil war were 
subsequently vetoed by the USSR.34
Beside regional crises, the US and USSR disagreed over the 
issue of international control of atomic energy and weaponry . In 
January 1946, the Security Council and General Assembly approved an 
American proposal to establish a United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission. Adapting a plan originally detailed in the Acheson- 
Lilienthal Report, the US representative to the commission, Bernard 
Baruch, presented a comprehensive proposal on June 14 for the 
international control of atomic energy and weaponry. The USSR 
presented a sharply contrasting proposal the next day. The Soviet 
proposal called for an agreement to ban the use of atomic weapons, to 
cease bomb production and to destroy existing bombs. It should be 
noted that the US had a monopoly on existing atomic bombs at the
time. The US plan, ir contrast, would establish immediate controls 
over the raw materials necessary for atomic weapons production. Only 
after such controls were instituted, would the US consider the 
prospect of destroying its nuclear stockpile. Even though the UN 
Atomic Energy Commission adopted the Baruch Plan, a negative vote 
by the USSR in the Security Council prevented any substantive action. 
Baruch resigned shortly thereafter, and serious US efforts to reach an 
agreement in this area came to a halt.35 The Soviet use of the veto in 
this case and others mentioned above, prompted the US to look to the 
General Assembly for support on matters of international security. In 
other words, the US turned to the "first. UN" to perform the functions 
of the “second."
Prior to the Korean War, the American representatives were 
reluctant to use the General Assembly for "propaganda" purposes or 
respond in-kind to Soviet diplomats' rhetorical attacks on the US. 
The desire to pursue the original US expectations of the Assembly 
remained strongly supported by Byrnes and Marshall. They felt that 
using the Assembly as a "propaganda" instrument would pose a threat 
to its future usefulness as an agent for diplomacy. Still, frustration 
with Soviet tactics in the Security Council was the catalyst for a re- 
evaluation of US goals in the General Assembly. In November, 1947, 
the Assembly adopted an American resolution establishing an Interim 
Committee of the Whole that could act when the Assembly was not in 
session. This committee could consider worrisome situations and 
disputes, set up study commissions and make available certain
facilities of the Assembly, such as truce supervision, for the promotion 
of international cooperation.
Social and Economic Concerns
Many of the most troublesome postwar problem1, were not 
matters of international security. During the mid-to-late la40's, the 
US tried to alleviate a myriad of economic and social problems caused 
by the war. The focus of US efforts at the UN in the area of economic 
and social problems was ECOSOC and, when necessary, the General 
Assembly. Conditions In Europe were of utmost concern to US. With 
the unanimous support of the General Assembly, the US asked 
ECOSOC in 1946 to act on recommendations for the reconstruction 
and integration of the European economy and establishment of an 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). While the ECE, provided 
some important assistance in the allocation of coal, its intended 
functions were superceded by unilateral American initiative outside 
the UN.37 The US did, however, utilize the UN to assist European 
refugees.
With the help of military authorities, the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), an agency established 
during the war, provided assistance to Europe's 12 million displaced 
persons. All but one million of these had been returned home by 
1946. The vast majority of the remaining one million did not want to 
be repatriated. The American directors of the UNRRA, Governor 
Lehman and Mayor LaGuardia, wanted to use the agency to assist those
who did not wish to repatriated, but Soviet obstructionism made that 
prospect unattainable. Consequently, in December 1946, Adlai 
Stevenson, at the time a delegate to the General Assembly, announced 
the American refusal to support the renewal of the UNRRA when it 
reached its dissolution date on June 30, 1947. Instead, the US 
proposed the creation of a new, temporary agency known as the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO). To ctrcumvent Soviet 
involvement, the IRO would be financed voluntarily and limited to a 
life of three years. With the dissolution of the IRO, the UNHCR was 
created. It should be noted that like the IRO, UNICEF was created to 
take on certain functions of the defunct UNRRA. Unlike the IRO, 
favorable coverage in the American press fueled public pressure to 
make UNICEF a permanent part of the UN. In contrast to both 
UNICEF and the IRO, from inception the US strongly endorsed the 
permanent nature of the FAO and WHO. Truman believed the work of 
these latter agencies would play a key role in the laying the 
foundations for peace.38 This concept seems analogous to George 
Sherry's suggestion that the component's of the "second UN" have 
been a stabilizing force.
The Decolonization Process and the Economic Development of 
Newly Independent Nations
The US pursued three basic policy objectives in this area. For 
the 11 Trust Territories, the US supported the creation of a 
Trusteeship Council to oversee the decolonization process. Separate
20
agreements were signed between the administrating countries and 
territories, the General Assembly endorsed the agreements and the 
Trusteeship Council became operational on December 13, 1946. As 
for particularly difficult cases outside the Jurisdiction of Trusteeship 
system, such as Palestine and Indonesia, the US supported the use of 
other mechanisms to facilitate the process of self-determination. An 
American initiative in the Security Council ultimately led to a 
successful cease-fire between the Indonesian rebels and the Dutch 
colonialists. The US also provided personnel support for UN mediator 
Ralph Bunche's efforts to arrange an armistice between the Arab states 
and Israel.39
As for what Truman called the "growth and improvement of 
underdeveloped countries," his administration gradually determined 
that some form of UN technical assistance program should be 
advocated. Many high ranking State Department officials had been 
opposed to such a program until after the Chinese Revolution. The 
reverberations of that incident convinced members of the Truman 
Administration that efforts to improve economic and social conditions 
in the developing world, not just Europe, were needed In 1949, the 
US proposed the establishment of the Expanded Program of Technical 
Assistance (EPTA). Approved by the General Assembly in 1950, this 
initiative marked a clear change in US and UN policy. Prior to the 
EPTA, the bulk of UN economic assistance had been channelled to 
Europe. This situation was primarily the result of US preoccupation 
with the impact that economic crisis would have on communist
21
expansionism. The EPTA was the first program to combine the 
activities of other UN agencies in a common effort. It offered 
developing countries technical experts, fellowships for native 
personnel and the establishment of training centers.40
The ICJ and the Human Rights Declaration
In 1946, the US Senate voted to accept the Jurisdiction of the 
World Court. This acceptance was subject to two conditions: "(1) The 
US shall have the right to determine whether any case falls within its 
domestic jurisdiction; and, (2) The declaration [of acceptance of World 
Court Jurisdiction) shall not apply to disputes involving multilateral 
treaties" unless all parties involved resolve to abide by the opinion of 
the Court.41 In 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This document made the protection and 
pursuit of human rights the responsibility of the UN. Eleanor 
Roosevelt, a US delegate to the commission drafting the declaration, 
worked intensely for its adoption.
The Impact of the Korean War on US Policy
The American response to the invasion of South Korea 
permanently changed the US role in and expectations of the United 
Nations. President Truman was determined to aid the South Koreans 
with the use of the UN. According to i-awrence Weller and Anna 
Patricia Simons:
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Whether by design or not, the Korean aggression 
challenged both the existing status of the United Nations 
as a limited agency for maintaining peace and Its potential 
development as a more effective instrument of collective 
security. Indeed, though it is unlikely that his motivation 
was shared by many other top United States officials, to 
the President, the preservation of the United Nations 
appears to have been a major motivation, rather than a 
result, of his decision to support the Republic of Korea.42
On June 25, 1950, the Security Council adopted a US resolution 
condemning the invasion, calling for a cease-fire and asking members 
to provide assistance to the UN in order to carry out the resolution. 
Passage of the resolution was assured because of the Soviet walkout in 
January to protest the seating of Chiang Kai-shek's rather than Mao's 
representative. The Council adopted another resolution on June 27, 
calling for UN membprs to assist South Korean in its efforts to repel 
the attack and to help restore peace in the area. Finally, on July 7, the 
Council adopted a resolution enabling the US to establish a UN Unified 
Command in Korea. While the bulk of the UN forces were provided by 
the US and South Korea, 16 countries participated in the operation. 
When the Soviets returned to the Council in August, the General 
Assembly became the focus of US efforts to maintain the operations of 
the UN Unified Command. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, 
proposed by Secretary of State Aeheson and adopted by the Assembly 
on November 3, Increased the role of the Assembly in matters of 
international security if the Council was obstructed from performing 
its functions. Thus, for the duration of the Korean War, the General 
Assembly exercised guidance over the UN operations.43
23
The Korean War affected US objectives in the General Assembly 
in another Important manner. Secretary of State Acheson believed 
that the Cold War had devalued United Nations system as a whole. He 
argued successfully that the US should use the General Assembly as a 
major "propaganda" instrument against the USSR. While Warren 
Austin remained reluctant to do so, the US Mission pursued more 
issues in the Assembly which had propaganda value. In addition, the 
Soviet's "Hate America Campaign," compelled the United States to 
engage in extended counterpropaganda campaigns.44
Trygve Lie and the Korean War
Secretary-General Trygve Lie fully cooperated with Washington 
in the mobilization of a UN force to support the South Korean 
government. As a result, he incurred the hostility of the Soviet bloc. 
Labelling the former Norwegian attorney a puppet of the West, the 
USSR vetoed Lie's re-election in 1951. The General Assembly voted to 
keep him in office for three years without another election. Persistent 
Soviet criticism finally forced his resignation in 1952. Ironically, 
some American politicians charged that Lie was "soft" on communism 
and that he allowed too many American communists on the Secretariat 
staff. To eliminate suspicion he permitted the FBI to set up an office 
in the UN Secretariat. Agents interviewed and monitored American 
personnel. In spite of these controversies, Lie made important 
contributions to the organization of the Secretariat and played a key 
role in the decision to place the UN headquarters in New York City.45
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US Policy as Public Relations
The Eisenhower Administration placed great emphasis on the 
propaganda aspect of the United Nations. In his second State of the 
Union message. President Eisenhower described the UN as a "place 
where guilt can be squarely assigned to those who fail to take the 
necessary steps to keep the peace," and "the only real world forum 
where wc have the opportunity for international presentation and 
rebuttal."46 His permanent representative to the UN, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, concurred with Elsenhower's view. Lodge told a Senate 
subcommittee that the General Assembly is "the greatest world forum" 
and "my guiding principle is never, never to let a communist speech 
take place without having a speech from the United States on the 
same day," so that news stories throughout the world would have 
"something about the United States position."47 Lodge had 
considerable influence on President Eisenhower. At Lodge's request, 
the President elevated the position of permanent representative to 
cabinet-level status.48
Highlighting the public relations aspects of the United Nations 
impeded the effective use of the organization as an agent for 
negotiation and conflict management. Nevertheless, the UN did prove 
useful to the Eisenhower Administration in several crises, and some 
US initiatives designed for public relations purposes did have 
constructive results. The IAEA and UN Special Fund are two examples 
of the latter.
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In attempt to maximize public impact. President Eisenhower 
proposed the establishment of the IAEA on December 8, 1953, in a 
long-awaited speech to the General Assembly. The proposal was 
ambitious but short on details. Negotiations were long and rancorous. 
When the IAEA was finally established in 1957 its main responsibilities 
were to encourage and assist the research, development and practical 
use of nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes. The IAEA would also 
establish and administer safeguards to help ensure thal nuclear 
materials intended for peaceful purposes was not diverted for military 
use.49
The UN Special Fund had a similar origin. By the mid-1950's, 
LDC's had become frustrated by their inability to establish a UN 
program designed to provide assistance for capital-intensive projects. 
Representatives from these countries turned increasingly to the 
General Assembly to pursue their economic objectives. In March 
1953, a Committee on A Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development (SUNFED) produced a report calling for a $250 million 
fund to finance capital projects in LDC's.50 President Eisenhower 
responded in April at an address to American Society of Newspaper 
Editors: "This government is ready to ask its people to Join with all 
nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by 
disarmament to fund world aid and reconstruction."51 Of course, this 
objective was never achieved. Pressure for a special fund continued. 
Finally, in 1957 the General Assembly adopted the US proposed 
Special Projects Fund (known as simply the IJN Special Fund). This
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fund, coupled with the EPTA, would have a Joint target of $100 
million. The US agreed to contribute 40 percent 52
Management of International Crises
The collective security aspect of the UN was not Ignored by the 
Elsenhower Administration. In fact, the US utilized the facilities of 
the UN to deal with several major crises In the mld-to-late 1950’s. 
The Suez Crisis of 1956, which coincided with the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary, posed a terrible dilemma for the US. The US could not the 
condone British, French and Israeli aggression against Egypt for fear 
that it would permit the USSR to expand its influence In the Middle 
East. Yet, the US did realize that their allies were provoked by 
Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and his support of Fedayeen 
terrorist raids against Israel. The US called for an emergency of the 
Security Council on October 29. An American sponsored resolution 
asking Israel to withdraw its forces and other countries to refrain from 
the use of force against Egypt was vetoed by Britain and France. On 
November 1, the US supported a successful Yugoslavian initiative to 
Invoke the "Uniting for Peace" procedure. The US and USSR worked 
out a compromise resolution in the Assembly calling for a cease-fire 
and the withdrawal of forces. Finally, on November 3, the General 
Assembly established the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) to 
secure and supervise the cease-fire. These actions were successful 
because all parties involved accepted the Assembly's resolutions.53
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In the case of the Soviet Invasion of Hungary, Secretary of State 
Dulles and permanent representative Lodge realized from the 
beginning that the USSR would be unwilling to accept the actions of 
the Security Council or the General Assembly. Still, they decided 
there would be some merit in trying. According to Maxwell Seymour 
Finger:
Having decided against the use or threat of force against 
the Soviets, the United States moved to use the UN for 
exacting the maximum price in propaganda and world 
opinion from the Soviets. Using the United for Peace 
procedure once more, the United States and friendly 
delegations move the discussion to an emergency session 
of the General Assembly after the Soviet veto in the 
Security Council...54
Thus, the US could only use the UN in order to condemn the Soviet 
action.
The Security Council did prove more helpful during the 
Lebanese Crisis of 1958. In June, the US supported a Swedish 
resolution establishing a UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 
to determine whether outside intervention was contributing to the 
struggle between Moslems and Christians. The UNOGIL investigators 
concluded that Arab nationalist under the direction of Egyptian and 
Syrian leaders were trying to overthrow the government. This 
conclusion was the pretext for the landing of 10,000 US marines in 
Lebanon on July 14.55
Finally, the Security Council again proved helpful to the US 
during the Congo Emergency. While the discussion of this crisis will
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be taken up in the next section, the events leading to the UN's largest 
peace-keeping operation began in 1960. After 55 years of Belgian 
rule, Congo became an independent republic on June 30. Within 
hours the Katanga Province seceded, riots broke out and Belgian 
troops returned to keep order. The civilian government, in turn, 
asked the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force. The Security Council 
approved the creation of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). At 
its peak, the UN forces totaled 20,000 troops. The cost of the 
operation was $400 million, of which the US provided $168 million. 
In September, Congo’s President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister 
Lumumba due to the Premier's collusion with the USSR. Lumumba 
promptly dismissed Kasavuba. In the confusion, a pro-Westem ally of 
Kasavuba, Joseph Mobuta, took command and established a regime in 
Leopoldville. The US lobbied intensively and with success to have the 
General Assembly seat the Kasavuba-Mobuta representative.56
Dag HammarskjOld: An Activist Secretary-General
The Eisenhower Administration was generally supportive of UN 
Secretary-General Dag HammarskJOld's activities. Lodge, in particular, 
maintained a friendly relationship with HammarskjOld. The former 
director-general of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, HammarskjOld was 
appointed in 1953 and served as Secretary-General until his death In 
1961. The Swedish diplomat developed a more activist role for the 
Secretariat. This activism often enraged Soviet leaders and 
occasionally annoyed Western governments. HammarskJOld's
accomplishments as Secretary-General brought him public acclaim in 
the West. In 1955, he attained the release of 15 Americans held in 
China. HammarskJOld also worked diligently for the establishment of 
UNEF and ONUC. The latter Infuriated Soviet General Secretary 
Khruschev.57
1961-68: Hope and Disaffection
The increasing numerical strength of the UN's membership 
from the developing world and the American preoccupation with the 
Vietnam War combined to have a significant Impact on US policy to 
the UN. While the election of John F. Kennedy promised a more 
active role for the US In the United Nations, support for the 
organization among key policymakers actually declined during this 
period. Nevertheless, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did appoint 
men of stature to the position of permanent representative: Adlal 
Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg and George Ball. Both Stevenson and 
Goldberg worked diligently to maintain a constructive role for the US 
In the UN. The influx of new states sparked the diminution of US 
interests served by the "first UN."
Reassessing the US Role
The inauguration of John F. Kennedy brought the hope of a more 
liberal policy in the UN on wide range of Issues. America's prestige in 
the United Nations reached its peak in 1961. Not even the Bay of Pigs 
disaster seriously damaged it. President Kennedy and Secretary of
State Rusk had two overriding goals toward the UN. First, the US 
should give more attention to the economic problems of the LDC's. 
Decolonization was well under way by the early 1960's. By the time 
Kennedy took office, the new nations nearly doubled the size of the 
United Nations from 51 charter members to 100 members. The 
ability of the US to muster a majority In the General Assembly was no 
longer a certainty. Second, Kennedy and Rusk wanted to make better 
use of the Security Council and the Secretary-General's "good offices" 
in dealing with regional disputes. Partly to indicate the importance of 
the UN to the new administration, Kennedy appointed Adlai Stevenson 
to the position of permanent representative. Yet, Stevenson and 
Kennedy did not have a close relationship and, In turn, Stevenson had 
less influence on US policy in the UN than his predecessor, Lodge.58
International Security and Financial Crisis
Soon after Kennedy's arrived in the White House, the situation In
the Congo began to deteriorate. Joseph Mobutu's troops captured
Patrice Lumumba and turned him over to the Katanga Province regime.
Lumumba was promptly executed. In the meantime, Antoine Glzenga,
an ally of the leftist Lumumba, set up a regime in Stanleyville that was
recognized by the Soviet bloc and several militant African nations.
American officials saw the UN as the only hope of preventing a full-
scale civil war. According to Finger:
Kennedy was convinced that 'if we didn't have the UN 
operation, the only way to block Soviet domination In the 
Congo would be to go in with our forces.' Stevenson
himself told the Security Council on February 15, 1961,
that 'the only way to keep the Cold War out of the Congo is
to keep the UN in the Congo.59
The UN did remain in the Congo. Under the auspices of the 
Secretary-General's "good offices,” an agreement between the 
Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes was achieved, and a moderate, 
parliamentary government was installed. In 1963, a military action by 
the ONUC succeeded in reuniting Katanga Province with the rest of 
the Congo.60 Although the ONUC achieved its objectives, the 
operation precipitate a major crisis in the UN itself.
Opposed to the ONUC, the USSR and France refused to pay their 
assessment of the operation's budget. Despite an ICJ opinion in 1962 
to the contrary and its acceptance by the General Assembly, French 
and Soviet diplomats argued that assessments for the ONUC were not 
mandatory. To keep the operation in the Congo going, the USUN 
devised a plan for a bond issue to cover part of the deficit. The 
nonpayment problems continued and financial crisis at the UN 
deepened. By the scheduled opening of the nineteenth General 
Assembly in September 1964, the USSR had arrears amounting to 
more two years' assessments. As a result, US representatives argued 
that the USSR was violation of Article 19. This article of the UN 
Charter states that a UN member shall lose its vote in the General 
Assembly if it is intentionally more than two years behind in its 
financial contribution. The USSR threatened to withdraw from the 
UN if its lost its vote in the Assembly. The US worked diligently
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throughout the summer and fall of 1964 to devise formulas under 
which the Soviet Union and France could contribute sufficient 
amounts to meet their Article 19 obligations and still maintain their 
position of principle on the ONUC. The USSR and France rejected all 
American proposals. The 1964 Assembly was postponed until 
December. When the Assembly did convene the US lacked the 
support to enforce Article 19. Normal UN operations remained at a 
standstill as repeated efforts to find a settlement failed. Finally, In 
1965, the US decided to contribute $25 million to a "Rescue Fund." 
The UN deficit was reduced by voluntary contributions. This action 
temporarily Improved the US position in the UN and put pressure on 
the Soviet Union and France to make similar contributions.61 
Unfortunately for the UN, the entire episode demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of the Assembly.
The United Nations proved helpful to US policy objectives 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. While the most important 
negotiations took place in Washington and Moscow, the UN facilitated 
US interests in severals ways. The most helpful actions were those of 
Secretary-General U Thant, who had replaced Dag HammarskJOld in 
1961. His mediation led to the diversion on October 25, 1962, of the 
Soviet ships which were headed for Cuba and would have been 
intercepted by the US Navy. The Secretary-General also offered to 
assure removal of the Soviet missiles with an UN inspection. This 
suggestion was accepted by the US and USSR, but rejected by Cuba. 
Beside the aid of U Thant, Stevenson used the Security Council as a
forum to present to the v >rld phol (graphic evidence of Soviet missile 
deployments in Cuba.62
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US Policy to the LDC’s
In addition to the Congo, President Kennedy utilized the UN as a 
springboard for his policies toward the other developing nations. 
Addressing the General Assembly on September 25, 1961, the 
President, proposed the UN Development Decade. The Assembly 
adopted Kennedy's recommendation and set a goal of a lea it five 
percent growth for developing countries. The US worked toward the 
fulfillment of this goal with the proposal for the UW Development 
Program (UNDP). By early 1961, Phil Klutznlck, US representative to 
ECOSOC, had convinced many other USUN officials that the strong 
management system of the Super Fund should be extended to the 
EPTA through a merger of the two programs. During the summer of 
1961, ECOSOC, at US initiative, founded a working group to study the 
possibility of a merger. The working group's report strongly 
recommended a merger. However, the British delegation voiced 
intense opposition to the merger. The US applied the full strength of 
its 40 contribution to both programs in order to lobby for support 
among developing countries. The LDC's offered their support and a 
compromise with Britain was attained. A merger formally occurred in 
January 1965, and the UNDP was born. Financed by voluntary 
contributions, the UNDP became involved in thousands of projects In 
agriculture, industry, health, education, transportation, social planning
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and housing. During the early-to-mid 1960's, the US also Increased it 
contributions to the WHO, which made great progress In efforts to
prevent the spread of malaria and smallpox; the FAO, which sent 
agricultural engineers into developing countries: and, various other 
specialized agencies. The US also contributed $200 million a new UN 
agency, the Asian Development Bank.63
The Kennedy Administration did have a major disagreement 
with the UN's non-Western majority over the formation of UNCTAD. 
In fall 1961, 27 LDC’s successfully put forward a resolution entitled 
"International Trade as the Primary Instrument for Economic 
Development." Most of its provisions were not controversial. 
However, the US strongly disagreed with a paragraph calling for an 
International trade conference. Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of 
State for IO Harlan Clevland felt that GATT was the appropriate forum 
and opposed a new conference. The LDC's pushed the proposal for a 
new conference through the General Assembly and ECOSOC. Realizing 
the risks of opposing the conference were too great, the Kennedy 
Administration finally decided to relent. UNCTAD I was held in 
Geneva in the spring of 1964. Although little of actual substance was 
accomplished, the conference was the birthplace of the Group of 77,64 
UNCTAD I is an important guldepost in the shift of power in the 
General Assembly from the US to the non-Western world.
The Johnson Years: Disappointment and Achievement
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The promising developments of the Kennedy and early Johnson 
years was soon replaced by a declining US role In the UN. Stevenson's 
relationship with President Johnson was poor. The permanent 
representative opposed the American Intervention In the Dominican 
Republic and believed that a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War 
was feasible and Justified.65 Shortly after Stevenson's death In July 
1965, Arthur Goldberg resigned from the Supreme Court and replaced 
him. Johnson referred to Goldberg as an "old and dear friend." The 
new permanent, representative accepted the Job on two conditions: 
(1) The permanent representative would have a greater voice in 
general foreign policymaking; and, (2) he would be a principle advisor 
and negotiator In all decisions leading to a negotiated settlement in 
Vietnam. Despite these assurances, Goldberg had little Influence on 
US Involvement In Vietnam.66
During Goldberg's tenure President Johnson's dissatisfaction 
with the IJN and Ills distrust of Secretary-General IJ Thant intensified. 
As US involvement in Vietnam grew, U Thant offered to act as 
mediator between the US and North Vietnam. The General- 
Secretary's tendency to publicly berate American policy, particularly 
the bombing of North Vietnam, did not endear him with President 
Johnson. Goldberg's efforts in this area proved futile as well. Although 
he succeeded in getting the Security Council to consider the issue, no 
substantive results ensued. To make matters worse, the prolonged US 
Involvement In Vietnam began to tarnish the Image of the US among 
the UN's non-Western majority. These factors made the UN less
Important In the minds of many members of the Johnson 
Administration.67
36
In spite of these problems, Goldberg proved to be very capable 
and used his considerable talents to achieve some significant 
successes at the UN. Goldberg's handling of UN deliberations on 
Rhodesia enhanced US prestige with the representatives of many 
black African nations. After Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in October 1965, pressure mounted within the UN for 
the organization to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia. 
Britain threatened to veto a resolution requiring member-states to 
establish an embargo on oil and petroleum products to Rhodesia. 
Goldberg worked out a compromise resolution requesting members to 
apply the embargo. In 1966, under intense African pressure, Britain 
asked for Goldberg's assistance in the drafting of a new resolution 
which included selective, mandatory sanctions against the Smith 
regime. Goldberg faced opposition in Washington from the 
Department of Defense, NASA and the Department of Commerce. 
Strong backing from the State Department, with the notable exception 
of Undersecretary of State George Ball, enabled Goldberg to capture 
Johnson's support. Later, the Security Council established a 
committee to monitor compliance with the sanctions and add more 
sanctions as it saw fit. For the remainder of the Johnson 
Administration, the US was a Arm proponent of all economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia.68
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In addition to Africa, American interests in the Middle East 
were also well-served by the efforts of the USUN. In fact, Arthur 
Goldberg's negotiations during and after the Six Day War of 1967 
constitute his greatest triumph as permanent representative. The 
forced withdrawal of the UNEF by Egypt and the subsequent Egyptian 
blockade of the Gulf of Aquaba precipitate a war in which Israel 
crushed the combined forces of Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Goldberg 
worked with the Soviet representative to establish a cease-fire on June 
10. Furthermore, Goldberg mustered enough support in the Security 
Council and General Assembly to derail Soviet attempts to label Israel 
the "aggressor" and set up a truce with conditions unfavorable to 
Israel. The USSR, in turn, decided to conduct bilateral negotiations 
with US. They appointed Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly 
Dobrynin, to negotiate with Goldberg. In November 1967, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted the Dobrynin-Goldberg 
compromise, Resolution 242. This resolution called for an Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories. It also established the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of every 
state in the area.69
The United Nations again proved useful to the US in January 
1968, when North Korea seized the USS Pueblo in international 
waters with 82 men aboard. Goldberg presented a strong case before 
the Security Council. During the debate the Hungarian representative 
received word that North Korea was prepared to negotiate for the 
release of the men. The negotiations were successful.70
38
The decision by President Johnson to begin peace talks with the 
North Vietnamese after the Tet Offensive, precipitate Goldberg's 
resignation in early 1968. Johnson asked him to stay to guide the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) through the General Assembly. The 
US and USSR had begun joint, work on the treaty in 1966. However, 
progress was delayed by the issue of inspection. After a series of 
secret negotiations, the US and USSR submitted separate but Identical 
drafts of the treaty. The compromise treaty made the IAEA 
responsible for inspection in nonnuclear states.71
To All Goldberg's position for the remaining months of the 
Johnson Administration, the President appointed Undersecretary 
George Ball. Although never particularly fond of the UN, Ball’s stint 
was marked by no significant changes in US policy. Ball did use the 
General Assembly to draw world attention to the brutal Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia.72
1969-75: Years of Estrangement
Except for the occasional use of the Security Council and the 
continued reliance on certain service agencies, President Nixon and 
Secretary of State (originally National Security Advisor) Kissinger felt 
that the UN was irrelevant to US global interests. A source of this 
anti-UN sentiment was the growing prominence of the non-Westem 
world in the organization, particularly the General Assembly. 
Throughout this period the US was often put on the defensive by the 
increasingly strident LDC's. In the minds of Nixon and Kissinger the
"first UN" served no purpose to the US and the "second" was of 
marginal importance.
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The major foreign policy objectives of the Nixon Administration 
focused on balance of power politics. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger had 
much enthusiasm for the United Nations. The President virtually 
ignored the people he appointed as permanent represent: Charles 
Yost, a career diplomat; George Bush, a former Texas Congressman; 
and, John Scall, diplomatic correspondent for ABC News. The deputy 
representatives during this period included men active in the 
Republican party with the notable exception of W. Tapley Bennet, a 
career foreign service officer.73 Ironically, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
the permanent representative whose views of the UN were most 
closely aligned to those of Nixon, was appointed by Gerald Ford.
Seating the PRC and the American Backlash
Soon after Nixon's inauguration in 1969, preparations for the 
observance of the UN's twenty-fifth anniversary began. Charles Yost 
urged the Administration to make some constructive proposals to 
bolster the United Nations. Nixon disapproved of that idea. The 
President did, however, accept a later suggestion by Yost to establish a 
presidential commission to study the role of the US in the UN. The 
commission, headed by Henry Cabot Lodge, produced a report in 
1970. Of the commission's 96 recommendations, two, although 
apparently unrelated, would subsequently become prominent and 
intertwined. The commission recommended that the US "reduce its
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current contribution of 31.52 percent to the assessed regular budget 
of the Organization so that eventually its share will not exceed 25 
percent."74 The other relevant recommendation was known as the 
two-Chlna policy. In essence, this policy meant that both the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan should be 
represented in the UN.75
Since the Chinese Communist revolution, the US had 
successfully kept the PRC out of the UN. Throughout the 1960's 
support for Taiwan eroded In 1970. a resolution to replace Taiwan 
with the PRC had majority support but lacked the two-third vote 
required for "Important question" resolutions. The number of 
countries supporting the view that it was an "important question" was 
also declining. After a year of consideration, the Nixon Administration 
finally decided in August 1971 to accept the seating of the PRC 
representative in the Security Council as part of a two-China policy. 
With the General Assembly session scheduled to begin several weeks 
later, the Administration did not give its diplomats enough time to 
build support for the US position. On October 25, the "Important 
question" view was rejected. An Albanian sponsored resolution 
recognizing the PRC as the sole representative of China was then 
adopted by large margin. In the Immediate aftermath, pro-PRC 
delegates staged a "victory celebration" on the floor of the Assembly 
which Included hugging, kissing and a even a dance by the Tanzanian 
representative. Scenes of the "victory celebration" infuriated members 
of Congress. Outrage in the Congress provided the Nixon
Aarrlnlstratlon with a pretext to lobby for a reduction In the assessed 
American contribution to the UN.76 A 25 percent celling was adopted 
by the General Assembly on December 13, 1972. Permanent 
representative George Bush worked diligently to assure passage of the 
resolution.77
Strained Relations with the Developing World
By the start of the Nixon presidency, the voting power within 
the General Assembly had clearly passed to the G-77. Confrontation 
between the US and the LDC's occurred over a wide range of Issues. A 
persistent source of tension was American policy to southern Africa. 
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the UN focused white- 
minority rule in Rhodesia, the status of Namibia and the system of 
apartheid in South Africa. In 1970, Charles Yost cast the first 
American veto ever In the Security Council In order to prevent the 
adoption of a resolution mandating severance of all relations. Including 
transportation and communication, with Rhodesia and the application 
of mandatoiy sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. Yost 
justified the veto on the grounds that the US could not leave its 
citizens anywhere without the means to travel or communicate. The 
permanent representative also argued that the sanctions against South 
Africa would not receive sufficient compliance in order to make the 
measures effective. In 1971, the US Congress passed the Byrd 
Amendment allowing for importation of strategically Important 
material from South Africa and Rhodesia in violation of existing UN
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sanctions. This action triggered tremendous resentment among the 
black African nations in the Assembly. Perhaps the most divisive 
controversy in this area occurred in 1974. The US vetoed a Security 
Council resolution expelling South Africa from the UN. In spite of 
American Insistence that the General Assembly had no legal authority 
to do so, the Assembly rejected the credentials of the South African 
delegation. The US did vote more often with the majority on 
resolutions concerning the status of Namibia. The US Joined the 
General Assembly and the Security Council in the condemnation of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia and to discouragement 
of South African trade, investment, tourism and emigration there. In 
addition, the US lent its support to a 1971 ICJ opinion declaring that 
South \frica illegally occupied Namibia. However, the US vetoed a 
Council resolution in 1975 that would have declared the South African 
presence a threat to international peace and security.78
Perhaps the most confllctual set of Issues concerned the 
economic development of the LDC's. In 1969, the US gave reluctant 
support to an initiative for a Second UN Development Decade. Senator 
Jacob Javlts, a member of the US delegation to the General Assembly, 
explained that the US did not approve of the language in the 
resolution implying a legal commitment to contribute one percent of 
gross national product in aid. Economic issues truly came to the fore 
with the Arab-oil embargo of 1973. Much to dismay of the US, the 
non-aligned movement began to use the General Assembly as a vehicle 
for the advocacy of a new type of international economic relations was
necessary. In May 1974, at the Initiative of the the G-77 caucus 
chairman, a Sixth Special Session of the Assembly was convened. 
After a series of nasty confrontations between the developed and 
developing countries, the session Issued a declaration for a New 
International Economic Order. In December, over the vehement 
opposition of the US and other Western nations, the Assembly adopted 
a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The US objected to 
the provisions permitting the nationalization and expropriation of 
foreign-owned property according to national law; recommending 
formation of producer association for raw materials based on OPEC; 
and, calling for a comprehensive system of indexation with terms that 
are highly favorable to LDC's.79 These actions prompted permanent 
rep John Scall to make following remarks in a speech before the 
Assembly:
When the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the 
majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it, and 
the parliament will cease to function. Every majority must 
recognize the minority becomes so outraged that it Is no 
longer willing to maintain the covenant which binds
them.80
Confrontation between the US and the G-77 in the Assembly peaked 
during Daniel Moynihan’s tenure as permanent representative.
Moynlhan, an outspoken neo-conservative Democrat, expressed 
his views toward the UN's developing world in his famous article, "The 
United States in Opposition." The nations of the developing world, 
Moynlhan claimed, were trying to institute the so-called "British
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revolution" of Fabian socialism, which they learned during the era of 
colonialism. This doctrine is characterized by a bias against capitalist, 
or Arnerlcan-style, development and an emphasis on redlstrlbutloning 
wealth rather than Increasing production.81 To combat this doctrine, 
Moynlhan recommended that the US go Into opposition and stand up 
for its beliefs:
Cataloguing the economic failings of other nations is 
something to be done out of necessity, not choice. But 
speaking for political and civil liberty, and doing so in 
detail and In concrete particulars, is something that can 
surely by undertaken by Americans with enthusiasm and 
zeal...It is time, that is, that the American spokesman came 
to be feared In International forums for the truths he 
might tell.82
Partly due to the aggressiveness of Arab representatives as well as 
Moynlhan's confrontational style, the thirtieth session of the General 
Assembly became highly contentious. The low-point was the adoption 
of the Infamous resolution equating Zionism with racism. Some 
critics, including Moynlhan's deputy W. Tapley Bennett, suggest that 
his tactics might have contributed to It's passage. Nevertheless, the 
incident provoked a storm of outrage in the US. As a result, the Ford 
Administration fittingly decided not to participate In or finance the 
UN Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.83
The Yom Kippur War
In contrast to the General Assembly, the US was able to use the 
Security Council to promote US interests in the Middle East. During 
the Yom Yippur war in October 1973. the USSR resupplied Egyptian
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forces and the US resupplied the Israelis. Consultation between 
Kissinger and Brezhnev brought about a Joint call for a cease-fire on 
October 22. On the same day, US and USSR successfully urged the 
Security Council to adopt a cease-fire resolution. Fighting continued 
and a Israeli rout of the Egyptian looked imminent. On October 24, 
the USSR gave strong indications that it intended to intervene 
militarily. In response, US troops were placed on alert. To prevent a 
superpower confrontation, permanent representative John Scall was 
instructed to discuss the need for a UN force composed entirely of the 
nonpermanent members of the Security Council. The nonpermanent 
members introduced a resolution on October 25 that called for a 
cease-fire and establishment of a UN Emergency Force, later known as 
UNEF II. The force was composed entirely of personnel from the 
nonpermanent members of the Council. Both the superpowers and 
the belligerents accepted the resolution, and the 4000-person UNEF 
II was set up on October 27. Scali later criticized the negligible role 
played by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim during the crisis.84
"Global Challenges" and the Role of the Service Agencies
In spite of his misgivings about the UN system as whole, 
President Nixon had high regard for the service agencies. The 
President believed that the UN could play a meaningful role in what he 
called the "global challenges." These were problems that transcend 
balance of power politics. Bilateral negotiations between the US and 
USSR led to adoption by the General Assembly in 1970 of the Treaty
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Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and Ocean Floors and, a 
year later, the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons. 
Social and environmental concerns also became prominent. In 1969, 
a UN Fund for Population Activities was founded. The US contributed 
one-half of the fund's $15 million budget. The UN Conference on the 
Human Environment convened in Stockholm from June 15-16, 1972. 
The conference unanimously adopted a declaration containing 
principles to guide nations in developing programs to help maintain 
the environment. In December, the General Assembly unanimously 
adopted a US resolution approving of these principles and setting up a 
secretariat for a new UN Environmental Program. American financial 
support was pivotal in the creation of the WMO's World Weather Watch 
Program. Later expanded, this program provided worldwide weather 
information otherwise Inaccessible to the US.85
1976-80: Attempted Reapprochement
With the appointment of William Scranton as permanent 
representative, the Ford Administration signalled a new trend in US 
policy to the UN that continued into the Carter presidency, one that 
emphasized accommodation not confrontation. The Carter 
Administration promised a fresh and hopefu1 new role for the US in 
the UN. By some accounts, relations with the non-Western world, 
particularly among the African nations, did improve. Nevertheless, the 
General Assembly remained an arena for conflict between the non-
. «ned movement and the US. Moreover, in the later years of the 
Cur er Administration, frustration and disappointment with the 
inetu etlveness of the UN heightened.
A Turnaround in US Policy
! > smayed by the deterioration of the American position in the 
UN, I re sident Ford In March 1977 asked close friend William 
Scrantu . a former governor of Pennsylvania, to replace Moynihan. 
Scranton quickly established a good working relationship with 
Secretary of State Kissinger and became the point man for a more 
conctliatoi / policy in the General Assembly. Soon after his arrival, 
Scranton suece ssfull^ argued against the adoption of a new "Zionism 
equals rac sra" resolution.86
Perhaps the most noticeable shift in US policy in the UN 
concerned the American approach to issues concerning southern 
Africa. Kissinger's concern with the emergence of Marxist regimes in 
Angola arH Mozambique prompted a reassessment of US policy to this 
region. In an address to General Assembly on September 30, 1976, 
Kissinger called for a commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia within 
two years and a timetable and mechanism for granting independence 
to Namibia. Earlier in that same year, the US had Joined in a 
unanimous vote in the Security Council to Impose new sanctions 
against Rhodesia. The US also supported a series of strongly worded 
Council resolution deploring the Soweto Massacre in South Africa and 
other manifestations of apartheid.87
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President Carter took office intending to continue the trend 
toward greater US involvement in the UN. His Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance, had a deep interest in the UN. According to Charles 
Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for IO from 1977 to 1979, the 
Carter Administration set out to change US policy in three major 
areas: funding, style and substance.88 Each area will be examined 
separately.
Funding
The US voluntarily enlarged its contribution to the UN under the 
Carter Administration. Excluding the service agencies, the US raised 
its voluntary contribution, in real terms, by 17 percent in fiscal year 
1977, 20 percent in 1978 and 13 percent in 1979. Voluntary 
contributions levelled off in 1980. Voluntary contributions to the 
service agency did not Increase across the board. The programs 
which benefited the most were the FAO and the WHO. In 1978, the 
American contribution to the former rose by 30 percent and the latter 
by 25 percent.89
Style: The Permanent Representative
From the beginning of the Carter Presidency until September 
1979, Andrew Young was the permanent representative. Young, a 
minister and civil rights leader, was a close political confidant of the 
President. Energetic and outspoken, Young’s main objective was to 
cultivate new links with leaders from the LDC's. By many accounts,
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Young's efforts produced some positive results, particularly among the 
black African delegations. For example, at a UN conference in 1977, 
Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph Garba hailed Young as the "symbol of 
a new and constructive United States policy toward Africa."90 Young 
quickly became a rather controversial permanent representative. His 
remarks that the British, Russians and Swedes as well as Presidents 
Nixon and Ford were racists embarrassed President Carter. Young 
later called the Cuban presence in Angola a "stabilizing" Influence and 
talked of American political prisoners. Nevertheless, Carter's support 
for him did not waiver until 1979, when Young resigned after 
revelations of an unauthorized meeting with PLO leaders.91 The soft- 
spoken Donald McHenry replaced him. Young's resignation prompted 
changes in the deputy representative posts. McHenry successfully 
secured two favorable Security Council votes, albeit Ineffectual, after 
the seizing of the US embassy In Tehran, and co-sponsored a 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly that condemned the 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. In March 1980, McHenry voted In favor 
of a non-binding Security Council resolution condemning Israeli 
settlements In the Occupied territories. Blaming the mistake on 
communication failure, President Carter disavowed the vote two days 
later.92
Substance: Re-emphasizing the Importance of the UN
When Charles Maynes spoke of a change in the substance of US 
policy, the change he referred to was "the recognition that the United
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Nations is a vital Ingredient in the conduct of the world's business and 
by our determination to make greater use of all of its machinery."93 
The results of this change In policy were disappointing. For example, 
human rights was an issue of particular Interest to President Carter. 
The President appointed Edward Mezvinsky as the first full-time US 
representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. The 
American emphasis on human rights did not alleviate the UN's 
tendency to focus on human rights in Israel, South Africa and Chile 
while Ignoring heinous violations elsewhere. Moreover, the US was 
unable to Illicit ample support for a convention against torture.94
Political problems In the Middle East also earned the attention 
of the Carter Administration. Outside of the UN, the US played a 
pivotal role In the signing of the Camp David Accords. At the UN, the 
peace between Israel and Egypt receive! a tepid response. The 
position stated in numerous General Assembly documents was that 
there could be no peace without a final settlement of the Palestinian 
problem. Other resolutions declared that any peace effort must be 
conducted under the auspices of the UN. Beside the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the UN responded to the deteriorating situation In Lebanon. 
The US supported a Security Council decision to establish the UN 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).95
The economic development of the non-Westem world remained 
a prominent issue during the Carter presidency. For the first two 
years, confrontation between the US and the non-aligned movement
seemed to lessen. However, In 1978, Cuba became the head of the G- 
77 and a new phase of hostility began. Strident demands and 
outrageous denunciations of the West were abundant. Disagreements 
between the developed and developing worlds impeded further 
progress the Law of the Sea negotiations. Hoping to draft a treaty 
which reserves the ocean floor for peaceful purposes and the use of Its 
resources for common benefit of mankind, the UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea first convened In 1973. The Third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, which had convened In 1978, was marred by quarrels 
between the Coordinating Group of Five (G-5), composed of the US, 
UK, West Germany, France and Japan, and the G-77 over the financial 
arrangements. These are the provisions provisions for payments by 
companies to the International Seabed Authority. Tensions were also 
evident in other forums. At the UNCTAD V in 1979, the LDC's 
vehemently called for trade reform. The G-77 pressed for reductions 
in Northern trade barriers on a nonreciprocal basis. In the General 
Assembly, the G-77 proposed the establishment of the Third 
Development Decade. The US opposed a key provision in the 
resolution that called for the developed countries to begin 
transferring, no later than 1985, 0.7 percent of GNP to LDC's.96
The politicization of the General Assembly spilled over into the 
service agencies. Concerned that the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) had become too diverted from its main purpose, to assist in 
raising labor standards and Improve working conditions, the US 
withdrew from the agency on November 6, 1977. In 1980, American
officials had determined that the political atmosphere had Improved, 
and the US rejoined the ILO.97
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Questioning the Value of the UN
Perhaps the greatest source of frustration was the perceived 
ineffectiveness of the UN. In spite of all the rhetoric and resolutions, 
by the late 1970's, the UN rarely shaped world events in a substantive 
manner. Non-Western dominance made many UN organs increasingly 
undesirable instruments for the pursuit of American interests. Most 
importantly, the UN failed to provide a constructive mechanism for 
dealing with Iranian Hostage crisis or resounding to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.
Kurt Waldheim: Opportunist, Puppet or Failure?
Members of the Carter Adminstratlon and Congress Justifiably 
directed some of their frustration with the UN at Secretary-General 
Kurt Waldheim. A former Austrian foreign minister, Waldheim 
replaced U Thant in 1972. Critics characterized him as a timid and 
ineffectual Secretary-General. During the selection process, it was 
widely rumored that Waldheim would use the UN post as a stepping 
stone for the Austrian presidency. American politicians, the most 
vocal of which was Steven Solarz, criticized Waldheim for his 
supposedly negative influence on the hostage negotiations and his 
inability to follow up on UN resolutions concerning Afghanistan. Solarz 
also rebuked Waldheim for his "gratuitous criticism of Israel."98 Of
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course, later it would be revealed that Waldheim had lied about his 
activities during the Second World War and that for years he may have 
been blackmailed by the USSR. In retrospect, it is difficult to 
establish whether or not Waldheim's performance as Secretary- 
General was influenced by his alleged blackmailers. Still, he 
exacerbated US difficulties in the General Assembly, particularly on 
matters concerning Israel.
1981-89: Confrontation and Rebuilding
In rather simplistic terms, the Reagan era began with UN- 
bashlng and ended with UN-pralsing. The Reagan Administration took 
office expressing serious doubts about the utility of the United Nations. 
The UN would receive US backing to the extent to which American 
foreign policy Interests were advanced. Permanent representative 
Jeane Kirkpatrick assumed a combative stance similar to that of Daniel 
Moynihan. Encouraged by the so-called "revolt of the moderates," 
Kirkpatrick became more accommodating by 1984, her last year at the 
UN. Kirkpatrick's replacement, Vernon Walters, maintained a 
somewhat more conciliatory approach. In the mid-1980's, the Reagan 
Administration and the US Congress made a concerted effort to 
reform the UN budget and provide the US with a larger role in how 
the organization's fund are spent. The "hard-ball" tactics produced 
promising results. Perhaps most importantly, over the past year, the 
UN has played an Increasingly substantive and visible role in conflict 
resolution.
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Challenging a Hostile UN
A primary concern of President Reagan was the issue of the UN's
effectiveness. During the first Reagan Administration, serious
questions about the future of the organization were raised. The work
of the UN seemed to have little impact on such pressing American
foreign policy concerns, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and the Libyan incursion into Chad. Many policymakers felt that the
UN had become hostile to American interests. According to former
Assistant Secretary of State for lO Richard Williamson:
When the Reagan Administration took office, the United 
Nations was hostile to US Interests, and the United States 
was in retreat. It had become commonly accepted 
practice to challenge the United States through the most 
grotesque rhetoric and name-calling. Efforts to 
delegitlmize Israel and even deny it credentials were 
accepted practices within the United Nations. A double 
standard existed in human rights whereby the clients of 
the Soviet Union avoided scrutiny while weaker and 
isolated countries such as El Salvador were condemned.
And in many respects the UN had become at best a
marginal actor on the world stage."
For example, the US Invasion of Grenada in 1983 drew harsh criticism 
from the UN. The US used its veto against a Security Council 
resolution condemning the action. An overwhelming majority, 
including US allies, voted in favor of a similar resolution in the General 
Assembly. During the early 1980's, calls for the US withdrawal from 
the UN heightened. Although this was not an option than many 
members of the Reagan Administration favored, public comments 
sometimes Indicated that it might be. Charles Lichensteln, a high
ranking official at the USUN. suggested that the UN could "go 
elsewhere" if It did not approve of US foreign policy.100
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Withdrawal from UNESCO
Displeasure with the UN extended to the service agencies. In 
December 1983, the Reagan Administration announced that the US 
would withdraw from UNESCO by the end of the next year. The 
reasons for this action, as explained by State Department Counselor Ed 
Derwlnskl, were as follows:
Politicization of UNESCO's traditional subjects In the 
introduction of programs, resolutions and debate on 
disarmament, "collective rights," and other extraneous 
themes: An endemic hostility toward basic institutions of a 
free society, especially a free market and a free press; The 
most unrestrained budgetary expansion in the United 
Nations system; and poor management throughout the 
organization, prime reasons for which were a top-heavy, 
over-centralized bureaucracy and a structure wherein 
excessive authority had flowed to the Secretariat and away 
from the governing bodies and member states.101
Effective December 31, 1984, the US withdrew from UNESCO.
Disaffection with the UN also mounted in Congress. In 1983, 
the Congress passed Public Law 98-164, which set two noteworthy 
conditions for American participation in the UN: (1) If Israel is
denied its credentials at the UN, the US will suspend participation 
until the action is reversed; and, (2) The Secretary of State must 
report to Congress each year regarding the policies of other member- 
states in the UN.102
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Jeane Kirkpatrick
The standard bearer of a more aggressive US policy in the UN 
was permanent representative Jeane Kirkpatrick. A staunch 
neoconservative and a professor at Georgetown University, 
Kirkpatrick's views had a profound influence on the formulation of US 
foreign policy during the first Reagan Administration. The best 
example of her philosophy Is the famous article, "Dictatorships and 
Double Standards". In the article, Kirkpatrick argues that the US 
foreign policy under the Carter Administration wrongfully 
subordinated US national Interest to abstract moral concerns and, in 
turn, hindered the US in its struggle against Communism.103 She also 
believed that there were two UN's, one positive and one negative 
(please note the difference in arguments). The service agencies were 
considered the positive UN because of their "good works". The 
political and security functions were the negative UN, because these 
functions exacerbated conflicts.104 This philosophy had a distinct 
impact on her actions in the UN. Eager to confront the hostile 
majority, Kirkpatrick believed that the US must state its views clearly 
and consistently at the UN In 1982, she stated: "Unless or until we 
approach the United Nations as professionals—professionals at its 
politics—with a clear-cut conception of our purposes and of the 
political arena in which we operate...then we won't ever know whether 
the United Nations could be a hospitable place for American national 
interests."105 Kirkpatrick challenged non-aligned nations in many 
rhetorical confrontations. Although her tactics often provoked
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re !< atment, Kirkpatrick successfully managed the adoption of General 
As; itibly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign (read: 
Soviet) forces from Afghanistan and Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. 
The deputy representative positions were filled mainly with people 
who were ideologically compatible with Kirkpatrick. At any one time, 
there was only one career foreign service officer serving as deputy 
representative.106
Throughout her tenure, Kirkpatrick remained a firm defender of 
Israel. She responded harshly to repeated and unfair attacks on the 
Jewish state. In 1982, Secretary of State George Shultz declared that 
if Israel's credentials to the General Assembly were rejected, the US 
would withdraw from the Assembly and withhold its assessed 
contribution. This threat was put to the test when the IAEA General 
Conference rejected Israel's credentials in 1982. The US temporarily 
suspended participation in the agency. The US lobbied vigorously in 
1983 for the IAEA to reinstate Israel. By a vote of more than 2 to 1, 
the General Conference adopted a motion not to consider challenges 
of any credentials. Both countries Joined the IAEA.107
Another region of particular interest to Kirkpatrick was Latin 
America. In 1982, she worked strenuously, but to no avail, to prevent 
Nicaragua from being elected to the Security Council. A year later, 
Nicaragua charged that the US was aiding the contras in their efforts 
to overthrow the Sandinista government. Nicaragua brought a 
compliant to the ICJ after the contras mined Nicaraguan harbors. The
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ICJ rendered a decision against the US in 1986. The US rejected the 
decision on the grounds that the Court disregarded the facts and the 
law. During the Falklands War, the US gave logistical and political 
support to the British. Concerned about possible damage to US 
relations with Latin America, Kirkpatrick held several meetings with 
the Argentinean delegation.108
An economic issue of particular prominence during the first 
Reagan Administration was the Law of the Sea. By 1981, completion of 
the convention seemed near. The Reagan Administration, however, 
decided to take a year and study the draft. Meanwhile, 118 nations 
signed the Law of the Sea Convention. In March 1982, the US 
announced that it would not sign the document The Reagan 
Administration objected to some of its restrictions on mining of the 
ocean floor and the voting formula for the Seabeds Council.109
Throughout 1984, Kirkpatrick's last year at the UN, 
confrontation between the US and the LDC's diminished. Adopting a 
more conciliatory style, Kirkpatrick achieved greater success in her 
efforts. In the General Assembly there were considerably fewer 
rhetorical attacks on the US. In the Security Council, Thailand won a 
seat over the Soviet candidate, Mongolia.110 This trend would 
continue after Kirkpatrick's departure.
"Revolt of the Moderates"
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Vernon Walters replaced Jeane Kirkpatrick. While Walters 
shared much of Kirkpatrick's political philosophy, his approach was 
much less abrasive. He was very well suited to deal with the changes 
occurring In the United Nations. Walters' background includes his 
experience as a career army officer (he reached the rank of lieutenant 
general), his tenure as deputy director of the CIA and his service as 
ambassador-at-large to President Reagan. Walters brought In people of 
extensive diplomatic experience to the USUN.111
The lessening of tensions between the US and the non-Westem
world, which began in 1984 and continued through the tenure of
Vernon Walters, is largely attributable to "revolt of the moderates."
Richard Williamson explains what is meant by this term:
Over a period of time, (the developing nations) learned 
that excessive rhetoric in the United Nations did have a 
cost. They were taken less seriously...The developing 
world has begun to understand that passing a broad 
resolution calling for a new International economic order 
has not put more food on the tables of the citizens in their 
countries...The result of these developments, nurtured by 
Secretaiy General Perez de Cuellar, has been a gradual yet 
perceptible of the G-77 nations toward more responsible 
behavior.112
In essence, greater pragmatism swept through the UN's non-Westem 
majority. Although the rhetoric within the General Assembly and 
other deliberative remains often reckless and excessive, from 1984 to 
the present there has been noticeable improvement.
Building on the work of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters made 
the reduction of unfair attacks on the US in the General Assembly a
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priority. At a US House of Representatives subcommittee hearing in
September 1985, Walters reported the following:
My first speech in the United Nations, was in response to 
the Vietnamese delegate who was lecturing me how the 
Reagan Administration should pay more attention to the 
opposition in the United States. I had to wait four and 
one-half hours to get the right of reply. When I finally 
spoke I said that I was intrigued that I was being lectured 
by the delegate of a country which has always brutally 
destroyed any opposition raising its head in his country.
He would be wise to leave those comments to a country 
which tolerated opposition.113
According to the last available report on voting practices in the United 
Nations, the General Assembly has clearly become less hostile to the 
US. An important indicator of this are the so-called "name-calling" 
references. These are explicit negative references to the US in an 
Assembly resolution. In 1985, there were nine such references, of 
which six were defeated. In 1987, there were only two "name calling" 
references and one was defeated. During the 42nd General Assembly, 
60 percent of all resolutions were adopted by consensus, up from 55 
percent in 1986. Of the remaining resolutions, the average voting 
coincidence of other UN members with the US was only 18.6 percent. 
Prior to the 1987 session, however, the staff of USUN identified ten 
key issues which directly affect the American interests. On the those 
issue, the voting coincidence was 56 percent. The countries with the 
highest levels of voting agreement were Israel, 80 percent, and the 
members of NATO, an average of 63 percent.114
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The success in the General Assembly was matched In other UN 
forums. For example, the Human Rights Commission condemned 
Soviet abuses in Afghanistan and put Cuba under the scrutiny of an 
investigative team.115 in The Security Council, In 1987, adopted 13 of 
the 15 resolutions It considered. The US voted In favor of 11 of these 
resolutions, and abstained on two others. Along with the UK and West 
Germany, the US voted against resolutions Imposing further sanctions 
on South Africa and condemning South Africa for Its continued 
occupation of Namibia.116 Another pleasant change occurred at 
UNCTAD VII in 1987. The conference was originally scheduled to be 
held in Cuba. Upon the request of the US, the conference was held in 
Geneva. In response to an American Initiative, permanent ties 
between UNCTAD and a symposium of international businessmen was 
established. The Final Act of the conference included unprecedented 
emphasis on the necessary role of the private sector in the economic 
development of the developing world. The Final Act was approved by 
consensus.117
The Struggle for Reform
It was, however, the economics of the UN system itself, 
specifically the question of budgetary reform, which proved to be the 
most divisive issue for the US. Congressional disaffection with the 
lack of American influence over the UN budgetary process peaked 
when in the midst of the Ethiopian famine, the General Assembly 
provided $74 million for a convention center in Addis Ababa.118 The
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Congress adopted legislation to force budgetary reform on the UN. 
The Kassebaum Amendment of 1985 stipulated that the US assessed 
contribution would be limited to 20 percent until the UN adopted a 
budgetary system with voting rights proportionate to the contributions 
of member-states to the organization. Combined with the 
delinquencies of other governments, the action by the US Congress 
placed the UN in dire financial straits. The staff of the USUN worked 
diligently toward some form of compromise. In 1986, a group of 18 
government experts, the G-18, was formed to look at UN  
management. The group's final report proposed, among other things, 
the creation of the Committee on Program and Coordination (CPC) to 
control the finances of the UN. Decision making by consensus in the 
21-member CPC was designed to give the US and other large 
contributors a leading role in shaping the budget. The G-18 also 
proposed a reduction In the number of committees and commissions, 
the excessive paper work and the Secretariat staff. After intense US 
lobbying, the General Assembly adopted the group's recommendations 
on December 19, 1986.1,9
Reacting to the adoption of the G-18's recommendation's, the 
Kassebaum Amendment was modified. Beginning In Fiscal Year 1988, 
the final 20 percent of the US contribution would be withheld until 
the President certified that three conditions have been met: (1) The 
CPC mechanism is implemented and its result are respected by the 
General Assembly; (2) Sufficient progress in attaining a 50 percent 
limitation for nationals of any member-state seconded to the
Secretariat; and, (3) implementation of a la  percent reduction in 
Secretariat staff.120
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President Reagan had asked for full funding for the UN in 1988, 
$212 million, and Congress authorized that amount. However, in the 
appropriations process the sum was cut to $144 million. Of that 
amount. $44 million was withheld under the conditions of the 
modified Kassebaum Amendment. By September 1988, US owed 
$532 million to the UN. On September 13, 1988, the President 
Reagan announced that the conditions of the amendment had been 
met, and the US would release the $44 million. He also ordered the 
State Department to work out a multiyear plan for paying back the 
remaining amount.121 The catalyst for this decision was a series of 
high profile accomplishments resulting from UN actions.
The UN Begins A Hopeful Phase
When Javier Per&s de Cuellar became UN Secretary-General in 
1982, he was determined to make the UN a more effective 
organization. Deeply dissatisfied with the diminutive role of the 
Secretariat under his predecessor, Kurt Waldheim, de Cu611ar became 
active in International security matters. As Secretary-General, the 
Peruvian diplomat has proven to be an effective, non-partisan mediator 
and administrator. Years of diligent effort finally paid off in 1988. 
First, the Afghanistan peace accords, mediated by UN Undersecretary- 
General Diego Cordovez, were signed in April. The Soviet withdrawal 
was complete by February 15, 1989. Next, on July 18, 1988, Iran
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accepted the Security Council's year-old Iran-Iraq cease-fire 
resolution. A truce began on August 20. and the first round of peace 
talks convened five days later under UN auspices. In the same month, 
de Cu611ar achieved an important breakthrough In the war between 
Morocco and Algerian-backed rebels. The UN also played a key role In 
the Namibian peace accord.122 Finally, the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to the UN peacekeeping forces. The new found success 
of the UN In the management of regional disputes is attributable to at 
least four factors: (1) The constructive and diligent efforts of the
Secretary-General and his staff; (2) Moderation and pragmatism 
among the UN's non-Westem majority; (3) The dramatic Improvement 
in US-Soviet relations,; and, (4) A  greater willingness to rely on 
multilateral organizations to facilitate the settlement of International 
disputes.
In addition, a significant development In US policy to the Middle 
East occurred as a result of UN activities. After the US dented an 
entry visa to PLO Chief Yasser Arafat, a special session of General 
Assembly was held In Geneva so that he could still address the body. 
At the session, Arafat renounced terrorism and tacitly recognized 
Israel. The US, In turn, lifted its ban on direct talks with the PLO.
The growing importance of the (JN to the US was evident In 
other facets of American foreign policy. Several service agencies 
acquired greater prominence in the 1980's. For example, the WHO 
has coordinated and advanced international AIDS research. The IAEA
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proved very helpful In analyzing the causes of the Chernobyl accident. 
Likewise, the WFP has played large role in African famine relief efforts. 
During its final year, the Reagan Administration expressed strong 
support for the UNDP and IAEA. In the 1989 budget, funding to the 
UNDP and the IAEA Increased, in real terms, by eight percent. 
According to Richard Williamson, the Administration hoped to 
"strengthen the UNDP as the primary source of funding and overall 
coordination for technical cooperation activities conducted by the 
UN." The funding increase to the IAEA reflects the Administration's 
"effort to reinforce overall credibility and effectiveness of international 
nuclear safeguards."123
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF US PARTICIPATION IN THE
UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations never did become the cornerstone of 
American foreign policy. Nevertheless, an analysis of the historical 
evidence will indicate that participation in the United Nations has 
benefited the United States. This section examines how the 
advancement of American interests has varied in relation to the "two 
United Nations," and the extent to which US performance and policy 
have hampered efforts to fulfill American objectives.
The "First United Nations" and American Interest
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When the UN was founded, the organs that constitute the "first 
UN" were clearly of secondary Importance to American policy makers. 
As the war-time alliance deteriorated Into the Cold War, the 
deliberative organs of the UN took on greater significance. During the 
1950's the "first United Nations" became an Important element of 
American efforts to contain the expansion of communism. With the 
support of the majority, the United States successfully used the 
General Assembly for "propaganda" considerations and to bypass the 
Soviet veto in the Security Council. According to Professor Robert 
Meagher of Tufts University: "In the East-West struggle, time and
again the General Assembly rallied to the support of the United 
States."124 Of particular importance was the "Uniting for Peace" 
Resolution enabling the US to maintain UN involvement in the Korean 
War. The usage of the General Assembly as a Cold War instrument 
clearly produced net benefits for American foreign policy. These 
benefits were not minor. The US was able to vent Its anger with the 
Soviet Union and gain the backing of many other nations. Support of 
the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution assisted the US in Its defense of an 
Important national Interest, South Korea.
Arguably, the usefulness of the General Assembly, as far 
American policy makers are concerned, declined appreciably with the 
changing composition of the UN. The newly independent nations 
used their majority power to put forth their own agenda. By the 
1970's, the "first United Nations" had become the preferred 
diplomatic forum of developing nations. Hostility to America and
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American values was evident. Certainly, participation in the "first 
United Nations" no longer appeared to serve American Interests. 
However, difficulties in the Assembly really reflect two factors: A
failure of American multilateral diplomacy and genuine opposition to 
US positions on particular Issues. The former with be discussed in full 
detailed later In this section. As for the latter, Edward Luck, former 
president of the United Nations Association of the United States, 
wrote:
The United States will remain in a minority position in 
most General Assembly votes on the Middle East, southern 
Africa and North-South economic issues until diplomacy 
begins to resolve the underlying issues. Although the 
rhetoric of more radical states is often offensive and 
should be rebutted strongly, American criticisms should be 
aimed at those states and not at the forum itself. The 
latter is tantamount to killing the messenger for delivering
the bad news.125
In other words, the problems the US faces in the Assembly reflect 
problems outside of it. This argument should not be overstated. The 
decline of America's ability in 1970's and early 1980's to obtain 
support for its interests in the Assembly is striking. However, some of 
the hostility, which still exists in ample quantities despite recent 
improvement, cannot be attributed to poor US performance or 
unpopular foreign policy positions.
In essence, the extent to which US interests are served by 
participation in the "first UN" is not clear-cut. Prior to 1960, the US 
was able to advance its objectives with relative ease. By some 
accounts, in the periods since then, the Assembly became hostile to
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American interests. If that were completely true than participation in 
the "first UN" would not be in the best Interest of the US. Quite 
simply, it would be too degrading. Opinions in the Assembly, World 
Court or any other deliberative body in the UN, at least partially, 
reflect world opinion outside the UN. As such, participation in the 
"first UN" heightens American awareness of these of opinions.
The "Second United Nations" and American Interest
Although the US has suffered setbacks, the "second United 
Nations" has advanced American objectives more consistently and 
constructively than the "first." The "second UN," on numerous 
occasions and in varying manners, has promoted US interests that 
cannot be met as effectively through either unilateral or bilateral 
actions. George Sherry, former Assistant Secretary-General, wrote in 
1986: (The Security Council, Secretariat, Trusteeship Council and
service agencies] are an invaluable factor of stability and can greatly 
facilitate the smooth operation of the international system, which in 
turn can serve American interests."126 Each of these organs has 
played an Important role, at one time or another, in US foreign policy.
The service agencies of the UN perform a multitude of 
marvelous tasks. Their functions address many of the most critical 
global challenges. Functions which no country can perform alone. In 
addition, the service agencies of the UN seem to have a near monopoly 
on the provision of basic humanitarian assistance to victims of 
disasters and emergencies. Altruism aside, over the years, US support
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of the service agencies has had many advantages. In some instances, 
unilateral US action would not be as effective as multilateral efforts. 
UN programs have also been able to operate in areas where unilateral 
US activity would have been unwelcome. In urgent or sensitive 
situations, the agencies have coordinated the efforts of many countries 
and programs.127 Of course, some agencies are more inefficient and 
politicized than others. Until recently, UNCTAD had been the launch 
pad for radical economic declarations. In the most extreme cases, 
such as UNESCO, the US has withdrawn from the agency.
The rob played by the UN in the decolonization process was also
very helpful to the US. During and after the Second World War,
successive US Presidents expressed their advocacy of peaceful
decolonization. The Trusteeship Council, \"<th American support,
oversaw the process and pushed it along. According to Professor
Donald Puchala of the University of South Carolina, the UN role in
decolonization facilitated US relations with its European allies:
Peaceful decolonization was even more welcome, since 
this spared the United States countless agonizing 
decisions about policies toward European countries that 
were N/TO allies on the one hand and contestants in 
colonial struggles on the other.128
The US zeal for the UN's role in decolonization diminished in the 
1960's as the Committee of 24 became more active.
Perhaps most importantly, the US has turned to the UN to the 
facilitate the resolution of crises and disputes. While the performance
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of the UN has been disappointing, efforts in this area have advanced 
American objectives. The successes of the Security Council have been 
extremely beneficial to the US; for example, settlement of the Yom 
Kippur War . Accordingly, the US supported, if not initiated, every 
enforcement act or establishment of peacekeeping forces. The 
Secretariat, on some occasions, has proven to be good at tasks that 
receive little attention such as mediation, fact-finding and consensus- 
building. In general, the US has benefited most from the work of 
activist Secretary-Generals, such as de Cuellar and HammarskJOld. 
Still, the underlying assumptions of collective security were shattered 
by the disunity of the Security Council's permanent member. As a 
result, the UN has been more successful at solving regional disputes 
than enforcement actions. The Security Council has, at times, 
sponsored resolutions hostile to US interests. During some phases, 
the Council completed very little constructive work. Likewise, the 
inaction or actions of some Secretary-Generals contributed to 
disaffection with the UN.
The Negative Aspects of US Performance and Policy at the UN
The effective advancement of US Interest at the UN has been 
undermined by poor policy formulation and execution. The rapid 
turnover of US representatives, the shortage of diplomats trained in 
multilateral diplomacy, the failure to recognize the organization's 
political nature and, the inability of the United States to project a 
coherent role for Itself at the UN contributed to the apparent political
impotence of the US in the organization from the late-1960's to the 
mid-1980's. These factors affected the fulfillment of goals in both
"UN’s."
American expectations of the UN changed gradually during the 
first five years of the organization. The Korean War signalled the 
abandonment of those original expectation. As American policy to the 
UN became dictated by the fulfillment of short-term goals, such as the 
use of the General Assembly for Cold War purposes, the role of the US 
became less clear. Successive administrations pursued policies to the 
UN which lacked a common goal or set of goals. By the 1980's this 
trend had become particularly evident. In 1982, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
told the Heritage Foundation that the US has "not been effective in 
defining or projecting a conception of our national purpose" at the 
UN.129 Edward Luck wrote several years later that US policy has been 
"ambivalent, defensive and lacking in strategic direction."130 In many 
ways, the basis of US policy to the UN from Presidents Johnson 
through Reagan seemed more often to be a loose set of impressions 
than a comprehensive set of goals.
Another factor hampering US efforts, particularly in the General 
Assembly, was the failure to recognize and adjust to the political 
nature of the organization. The same basic methods of persuasion, log­
rolling, deal making, diplomacy and economic and political pressure 
which are used in US state legislatures are employed at the UN. The 
structure of the General Assembly is quasi-legislative. Voting blocs,
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such as the G-77 or ASEAN, became the UN's equivalent of political
parties. The US has been a country without a bloc. Jeane Kirkpatrick
recognized this fact and tried, with mixed success, to apply It to the
actions of herself and her staff:
We worked very hard at trying to establish some levers of 
influence in the UN, doing some lobbying, and linking our 
policies In the UN to our policies outside of the UN. It's 
nothing but common sense. Any Indiana legislator who 
applied the same principles in the world that he applied 
generally in is his work would have arrived at the same 
views about what to do about the American position in the 
United Nations.131
Kirkpatrick's ideas had merit, but her to tendency to provoke 
confrontations weakened the potential impact of her attempt at bloc 
politics.
An additional problem caused by the political nature of the UN is
that many American representatives to the UN have not been trained
for multilateral diplomacy. Some permanent representatives did not
have any diplomatic experience or training before taking the position.
However, permanent representative have typically had political
experience that proved to be very helpful. For example, Arthur
Goldberg had been a labor negotiator. As for the diplomats on the
USUN staff most were trained in bilateral diplomacy. This is not to
suggest that foreign service officers are not well trained. Rather, most
foreign service officers did not receive instruction in multilateral
diplomacy. Richard Williamson wrote in 1986:
By the nature of their training and experience they have 
broad familiarity with world affairs. However, they are not
given the particular tools to become good multilateral 
diplomats. That Is not to say there are no FSO's good at 
multilateral diplomacy; some are excellent. But they are 
the exception, not the rule.132
The skills necessary for dealing with the complex demands and 
interactions of a multilateral forum, such as the UN, are different than 
those needed for bilateral diplomacy. A multilateral diplomat must be 
politically aware of the wide range of national interests pursued by a 
large number of countries. Good multilateral diplomacy also requires a 
clear understanding of rules of procedure.
None of these problems constitute catastrophic mistakes. 
However, the problems do indicate that some aspects of US difficulties 
at the UN were avoidable in the past and may be preventable in the 
future.
THE FUTURE OF US PARTICIPATION IN THE UN
George Bush's policy to the United Nations remains unclear. 
The appointment of Thomas Pickering to the position of permanent 
representative is the perhaps the best clue of the President's 
intentions. Pickering, a career foreign service officer, has served as 
ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador and, most recently, Israel. 
Breaking a tradition began with the appointment of Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Pickering is not a member of Bush's cabinet. According to
Clifford May, journalist for the New York Times, there are two reasons 
for this decision. First, it insures that the policy made by the 
President and State Department is espoused at the UN. Second, it 
signals that the UN will be considered a diplomatic post and, as such, 
will be treated like any other diplomatic post.133 The Bush 
Administration intends to maintain tight control over the formulation 
of policy to the UN.
Thus, with very little known about the future of American policy 
to the UN, the purpose of this section is to suggest a new strategy for 
US participation in the UN. While emphasizing the opportunity for 
American leadership in the "second UN,” the policies recommended 
in this section cannot be achieved without greater US influence in the 
"first UN."
The Case for Multilaterlalism
Many politicians and academics pay lip service to the new 
"interdependent" world and the need to pull together, but few can 
quite figure out how to go about it, much less what the trade-offs are. 
Mere advocacy of "burden sharing" will not induce governments to 
choose a multilateral mechanism over the alternatives if it does not 
appear to be in their national self-interest. The foremost multilateral 
mechanism is the United Nations. Over the past four decades 
participation in the UN has served the national self-interest of the US. 
Taking into account the budget constraint that the US government is 
likely to experience in the upcoming decade, the question of UN
effectiveness will likely become more Important than ever. Delegating 
responsibility on some issues to cost-effective multilateral mechanisms 
be pursued in order to reduce the federal budget deficit. As indicated 
in the previous section the activities of the "second UN" have more 
consistently and constructively advanced American interests than 
those of the "first." Consequently, in determining what future 
American objectives could be well served by the activities of the 
United Nations, the focus will be on the functions of the "second UN."
Governments are increasingly forced to recognize that the 
means for dealing with a lengthening agenda of problems are beyond 
the scope of unilateral action. Many scientific, economic and political 
concerns are now global in dimension. Some of these transnational 
concerns require urgent attention. The UN is not the appropriate 
organization for dealing with all transnational problems. Effective 
action on certain issues should be left up to bilateral or regional 
machinery. Still, in matters of particular concern to the US, the UN 
may be able to play a helpful role .
The Role of the UN in Conflict Resolution
Regional conflicts pose a constant danger of escalation and 
consequent destabilization. While the UN has made positive 
contributions to peacekeeping and conflict resolution since its 
foundation, the organization seems to have become increasingly 
successful in this area during the last year. The US has been very 
supportive of these recent and continuing efforts. As the developing
nations acquire new types of weaponry, the danger Inherent in 
regional conflict will increase. In turn, the need for a strong 
mechanism of international conflict management will heighten. 
Recent evident suggests that the UN is well-suited for the role.
The Role of the UN in Global Problem-Solving
The UN remains one of the most important mechanisms for 
coping with pressing environmental concerns. Such phenomena as 
ozone depletion, acid rain, the "greenhouse effect," deforestation, 
chemical contamination of water and food and many others cannot be 
effectively addressed on a national level. The UN can provide the basis 
for coordinating national environmental policies. For example, the 
International Agreement on Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) was signed at 
a UN-sponsored conference. An issue which affects the environment, 
but falls under the auspices of the IAEA is the disposal of nuclear 
waste. The dangers of nuclear energy and weaponry may become 
frighteningly more significant in the 1990's. Future treaties 
concerned with nuclear safety and nuclear weapons proliferation may 
depend on the enforcement ability of the IAEA. Similarly, the 
capability of the UN to deal with human security issues, such as 
population growth, world hunger and urban conditions, will need to be 
expanded. While the primary effects of these issues will continue to 
be most noticeable in the developing world, the consequences will 
affect the US and the rest of the developed world.
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A NEW STRATEGY FOR US PARTICIPATION IN THE UN
The United Nations is now experiencing its most promising 
phase since the fleeting excitement of its foundation. The genuine 
success of the organization has once again sparked high expectations 
for the future. Yet. there is a real danger that these expectations will 
be dashed if the UN fails to build upon the its recent 
accomplishments. To do so will require leadership. That is one 
element that the UN lacks. Secretary-General P6rez de Cuellar has 
done a brilliant Job, but his success is dependent upon willingness of 
nations to use the UN constructively. The developing world, which 
dominates the UN numerically, has enhanced the functions of 
organization with its trend toward pragmatism. However, in the past, 
the developing world maintained its unity by allowing the more radical 
states to shape the agenda and set the tone for their participation in 
the UN. If the moderate nonaligned states are to continue coming to 
the forefront, they must be encouraged to use the organization 
constructively. As for the USSR, it is too early to tell whether or not 
its new found admiration for the UN is enduring.
This leadership void presents the United States with a 
significant opportunity. As the organization's largest contributor, the 
US can reassert it.ii leadership by demonstrating that the UN has a 
central role in global affairs and Its activities are be taken very 
seriously. This task requires greater linkage between American
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bilateral and multilateral policy and the establishment of a 
comprehensive set of goals for the US role In the UN. The strategy 
advocated in this study has three elements: (1) Adjust to the politics 
of the "first UN" and use it to forge new ties with the developing 
world: (2) Develop new initiatives in order to expand the usefulness of 
the "second UN," particularly the service agencies: (3) Encourage and 
support the role of the UN in conflict management; and, (4) Cultivate 
consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council 
during the selection of the next Secretary-General.
The "first UN," especially the General Assembly, is the preferred 
diplomatic forum of many developing countries. Increasing numbers 
of nonallgned state recognize that the passing of resolutions is, at best, 
a very ineffective way to bring about change. Nevertheless, it provides 
them with the chance to express their views and set an agenda. To 
demonstrate American concern for the views of the non-Westem 
world, the US should treat the "first UN" with greater seriousness. 
Richard Williamson expressed the hope that the Bush Administration 
would do just that:
If we properly recognize the importance of these new 
nations to US vital interests and also the importance these 
nations place on the United Nations, then we should 
actively and constructively engage them diplomatically 
within the UN framework. This means working with them 
on issues of importance to them while we work on our 
own agenda, constructively negotiating on resolutions and 
working for common ground.134
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Working effectively In the "first UN requires that US representatives 
adjust to its political nature. The development of skills in multilateral 
diplomacy is a necessity. Creating a specialization within the foreign 
service in multilateral diplomacy would be quite beneficial. A study by 
a Congressional sub-committee indicates that many countries have 
such specializations, and their representatives arrive at the UN having 
already served in two or three other multilateral diplomatic posts.133
Success in the "first UN" will likely facilitate success in the 
"second." To advance US interest and enhance the role of the "second 
UN," the US should formulate sensible initiatives with wide potential 
appeal. A possible initiative was suggested in 1987 by the United 
Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA). In a 
published report, the UNA-USA concluded that the US should 
advocate refonn of ECOSOC. For the purpose of this study, ECOSOC 
had been considered part of the "first UN." However, the UNA-USA 
proposal would place ECOSOC at the center of the UN's role in global 
problem-solving. ECOSOC would be expanded to the size of the 
General Assembly, and committees in other organs dealing with 
economic scientific and social Issues would be eliminated to prevent 
duplication of effort.136 Most importantly ECOSOC would be provided 
with three functions which would facilitate the coordination of 
national, regional and service agency activities on various economic, 
social and scientific Issues:
Global watch-to identify the issues on which convergence
of Interests exist; Consensus building-to bring about
common views with regard to those interests; and, 
Consensus conversion-to translate, usually by some form of 
collective action, common views and communities of 
interest into outcomes useful to the affected countries.137
This proposal is one of many possible ways to enhance the role of the 
UN in global problem-solving. Much depends on the willingness of the 
US to use the various mechanisms of the UN to focus world efforts on 
some of the most pressing transnational challenges.
Foremost, the US must continue to support and encourage the 
role of the UN in conflict management. When countries have been 
ready to settle their disputes, the UN has facilitated the process. If 
the record of past success is to be built upon, the US must spur the 
Soviet Union to sustain its cooperation in this area. At same time, 
maintenance of the UN peacekeeping forces and the staff of the 
Secretary-General depends upon the US paying its assessed 
contributions. American interests have clearly benefltted from the 
work of the UN forces and negotiators. Lack of funds will undermine 
their future efforts. The Bush Administration would be wise to fully 
fund this cost-effective method of promoting international stability.
An effective role for the UN in conflict management also 
depends upon the performance of the Secretary-General. P6rez de 
Cudllar has proven to be a skilled and impartial diplomat and an adept 
administrator. He has been successful not only because he is an 
activist, but because he is neutral activist. Unfortunately, he is unlikely 
to seek another term. Once it becomes certain that de Cuellar will
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step down, the US must act vigorously to find a suitable replacement. 
If cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council 
persists on matters of international security, then the selection of a 
person possessing similar qualities to those de Cu611ar would be in the 
best interests of the UN. Since the election of Secretary-General is 
considered a "substantive" matter, permanent members can veto the 
nomination of any candidate. The US should use this power, if 
necessary, to prevent the election of a potentially Ineffective or 
partisan candidate.
Policy Implementation
Despite the current optimism, significant problems still plague 
the UN. These problems may present obstacles to enhancing the US 
role in the organization. Of foremost concern are the UN's financial 
difficulties. To enact further reforms, full payment by the US of its 
assessed contribution is necessary. However, it remains to be seen 
whether the Bush Administration and Congress will be willing to pay 
in full US arrears to the UN. Battles between the Congress and the 
President over ways to lower the federal deficit may make full payment 
politically, if not financially, difficult. As for the particular organs of 
the organization, the General Assembly is still a highly politicized body. 
Hostility to the US has clearly declined and the salience of certain 
issues that in the past have placed the US on the defensive have 
diminished. Still, Assembly resolutions continue to receive more 
media attention than the quiet work of the Secretariat and Service
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Agencies, this problem will continue to provide critics of the UN will 
ammunition for their rhetorical attacks. While appointing 
confrontational permanent representatives may please those already 
leery of the UN, it would likely undermine US efforts in the Assembly. 
As for the "second UN,” there appears to be few opponents of the 
activities and programs of the Service Agencies, with the notable 
exception of highly politicized and inefficient agencies such as 
UNESCO. The activities of the Security Council and Secretariat are 
more controversial, because such activities may preclude unilateral 
American action. Future administrations must make a strong case to 
critics of the UN that American Interests are sometimes best served 
by supporting and encouraging UN efforts in matters of dispute 
resolution.
CONCLUSION
American policy toward the United Nations should focus on the 
organization's most constructive functions. As such, the US should 
emphasize the UN's role in conflict resolution, crisis management and 
global problem-solving rather than its utility as a forum for political 
opinion. Quite simply, American Interests are better served in the 
"second UN."
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The activities of the Security Council and Secretariat are of 
principal importance to the United States. The outcomes of some 
regional conflicts may be more consistent with US interests if dealt 
with by the Council and Secretariat rather than unilateral American 
action. Although neither has been able to deal with certain problems, 
both have helped to deter or resolve disputes in many dangerous 
situations. Continued and improved effectiveness of the Council and 
Secretariat will, however, require American leadership,.cooperation 
between the US and other permanent members and the presence of a 
diligent Secretary-General who is not hostile to US Interests.
The beneficial activities and programs of the service agencies 
should also receive strong US support. While some agencies are 
politicized or inefficient, most perform very useful functions The 
service agencies facilitate the international flow of communications, 
technology and humanitarian and developmental assistance. Many of 
these tasks are essential to the smooth working of the international 
system. Yet, as demands for new programs and activities heightens, 
the US should promote greater coordination and efficiency .within and 
amongst the agencies. The proposal offered by the UNA-USA warrant 
consideration.
Emphasizing the "second UN" does not mean ignoring the 
"first." Clearly the US should work to improve its standing in the 
General Assembly. The "first UN" remains one of the best places for 
the US to be exposed and sensitized to the concerns of the developing
world. Recognizing the political nature of the Assembly and training 
representatives in multilateral diplomacy would be worthwhile. Still, a 
preoccupation with votes In the General Assembly v ' only lead to 
frustration. Instead, a policy designed to promote a less politicized 
"first United Nations" but emphasizing a more effective "second" Is in 
the best Interests of the United States.
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